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EXTERNAL REVIEWS - WHICH WAY FORWARD? 
A TAC Progress Report on the External Review Process 
summary 
External reviews are one of the cornerstones on which confidence in the 
CGIAR System has been built. It is essential that they should remain thorough, 
comprehensive and objective. 
This report outlines the main stages in the current review process, 
describes the functions of the TAC Standing Committee for External Reviews 
and reports briefly on its first three years of operation. 
Changes in the nature and coverage of reviews have increased the 
complexity of the tasks that panels are expected to perform and made it more 
difficult to find suitable panel members and chairs on the scale required. As 
reviews have evolved, the boundaries between programme and management 
have become more difficult to define, and reviews are increasingly being 
conducted jointly, under a single chair. 
Some of the trade-offs confronted by those who plan and organize 
reviews are outlined and the consequent difficulties of meeting all the 
expectations of Group members explained. 
The Group’s views are sought on experimenting with modifications to 
the review process, designed to reduce the burden on panel members and the 
total number of reviews required. Views are also sought on whether or not to 
introduce a more formal process of monitoring the implementation of 
recommendations. 
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1. Introduction 
External reviews are generally regarded as one of the cornerstones on which confidence in 
the CGIAR Centres has been built. At meetings of the CGIAR, debates following the 
presentation of review reports continually reveal the importance that members attach to them. 
However, the expectations of what reviews should accomplish, as revealed during these debates, 
suggest that there is a need to keep the Group more fully informed on the background of 
experience acquired by those who plan, organize and conduct the reviews, 
Indeed, having regard to all the effort that is put into reviews, the final report represents 
only the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the surface, there is a great deal of activity that determines 
whether or not a review will be successfully conducted and whether the report will match up to 
the expectations of the Group. This paper discusses mainly that part of the iceberg that is not 
normally visible. 
It analyses the reasons that are leading to gradual changes in the nature of reviews, 
exposes some of the concerns of those who manage them, and provides an opportunity for 
members of the Group to reflect on what they might reasonably expect from future reviews. 
Finally, some options for possible changes are presented to obtain initial reactions from the 
Group on where their preferences lie. 
2. Some Basic Considerations 
External reviews constitute one of the most important elements in the mechanisms that 
strengthen the accountability of the Centres to their donors and clients. From their inception, the 
primary purpose of reviews has been to ensure the quality and relevance of Centre activities and, 
more recently, to give added certification on matters of governance, management and 
cost-effectiveness. Reviews of these Centre-specific matters are supplemented by reviews of 
System-wide programmes or activities, designed primarily to examine overall strategies for the 
Centres, taking into account the needs of national programmes. 
To achieve these primary purposes, reviews must be independent, objective and 
comprehensive. Only if there is complete confidence in the process can external reviews be 
accepted by donors as a substitute for mounting their own reviews or audits. For this reason 
alone it is vital that external reviews continue to match up to donor expectations. Moreover, they 
must continue to contribute to the additional requirement that Centres should be accountable to 
their partners and clients in the developing countries. 
From the Centre’s standpoint, preparation for an external review provides an opportunity 
for self-evaluation which, to some extent, compensates for the time that senior management and 
programme staff have to spend on reviews. In many ways, preparation for the review is as 
important as the review itself and, properly conducted, the two processes can be mutually 
reinforcing. 
3. An Outline of the Process 
For external reviews of the individual Centres, procedures have come a long way since the 
first “quinquennial” review was conducted in 1976. Organizing and conducting reviews involves 
five closely interrelated procedures: planning, briefing, assessing, report writing, and debriefing. 
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Subsequently, the review reports are presented to TAC and the Group. No review is considered 
to be complete until the Centre, TAC, the CGIAR Secretariat and the Group have all had 
opportunities to comment on the report. 
3.1. Planning 
Overall planning of reviews is based on a running schedule projected five years into the 
future. The aim is for reviews to be conducted at roughly five-yearly intervals but, as already 
agreed by the Group, some flexibility has to be allowed to make essential adjustments, such as 
those that have been needed over the past few years to bring reviews into phase with Centre 
submissions of medium-term programmes and budgets. 
Planning for individual reviews begins from two-and-a-half to three years before the report 
is scheduled to be presented to the Group. Under present circumstances, ten or more reviews 
may be under consideration, in one respect or another, in any single year. Dates are agreed with 
the Centres, short lists of potential chairs identified, “profiles” of the panel prepared in terms of 
the expertise required, and lists of potential members drawn up. 
Members of the CGIAR are invited to comment on the terms of reference and to submit 
additional questions to be taken into account during the review. Planning the details proceeds 
more or less continuously until the reviews have been completed. It involves close liaison among 
all concerned: Centre boards and management, panel chairs and secretaries, the two Secretariats, 
and the panel members. 
3.2. Briefing 
Panel chairs are initially briefed on the conduct of the review by the TAC Chairman 
(sometimes delegated to the Chairman of the Standing Committee), and by the CGIAR 
Secretariat. The former concentrates on programme issues; the latter on management issues. 
Arrangements are then made to brief the panel members, often associated with what has become 
known as the “initial phase” of the review, which takes place at the Centre. It provides the main 
occasion for the Centre to present its activities to the panel, and for the panel to identify the 
most important issues. The process of assessment begins during this phase of the review, which is 
usually arranged to coincide with either a meeting of the full board, or of its programme 
committee. 
3.3. Assessing 
The process of assessment continues during the “country visits” which follow the initial 
visit to the Centre, and are planned to gain maximum benefit from them in terms of what can be 
seen on the ground. Usually, only the first visit involves all panel members. Thereafter visits are 
made by sub-panels, as appropriate. During the country visits, panel members have opportunities 
to interview, “in camera”, what is designed to be a representative sample of the Centre’s 
beneficiaries and clients. 
A great deal of attention is given to the selection of the countries visited, taking into 
account preferences expressed by the Centre, but having close regard to possible weaknesses of 
the Centre as well as its strengths. The information gained from these visits is supplemented by 
the replies to ,a questionnaire which is widely circulated to institutions in developing countries as 
part of the preparation for the review. 
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3.4. Renort Writing 
The interval between the initial phase of the review and the “main” phase is usually from 
three to six months, but is occasionally shorter. During this period the country visits are 
completed, initial assessments more widely tested, and panel members are encouraged to make 
initial drafts of the sections of the report assigned to them. 
The main phase of the review, during which the final report is prepared, takes place 
entirely at the Centre. It usually lasts from 18 to 21 days. Further assessment and report writing 
continue in an iterative manner until the report is completed and the recommendations agreed. It 
is then presented to the Board and staff. 
3.5. Debriefing 
As soon as a review has been completed, views are sought from the Centre Director, 
panel chair and secretariat staff on the strengths and weaknesses of the review and what new 
lessons have been learnt. Debriefing is largely an informal process but provides valuable 
feed-back into the detailed planning of other reviews in the pipeline, as well as giving additional 
briefing material for new panels. 
4. The TAC Standing Committee for External Reviews 
4.1. Functions of the Committee 
Historically, a great deal of time has been spent during TAC meetings on guiding the 
planning of reviews and monitoring progress. Largely as a response to TAC’s increasing 
workload, the TAC Standing Committee for External Reviews was created in 1988. Its primary 
purpose is to relieve TAC of some of the work formerly done in plenary sessions, while not 
changing the pattern of decision-making on key aspects, such as the appointment of panel chairs 
or the basic principles for conducting reviews. 
To this end, the Standing Committee has done a great deal of preparatory work on such 
matters as the long-term planning of reviews, their terms of reference, the selection of short lists 
of panel chairs, and the suggested size and structure of panels. In addition, it has been heavily 
involved in searching for new candidates for panel membership, formalizing briefing procedures, 
monitoring the problems that arise during reviews, and considering suggestions for improvement. 
In all of its deliberations the committee benefits from the involvement and inputs of the CGIAR 
Secretariat, through the participation of one or more of its staff. 
The Standing Committee’s initial terms of reference (see Appendix I) embraced all these 
aspects of a programme review, as well as charging the Committee with the responsibility to 
consider ways of making the whole process more cost-effective. As the work progressed, 
however, it became obvious that there was a need for a forum to foster closer coordination of the 
programme and management aspects of reviews, and this was added to the Committee’s terms of 
reference. 
4.2. A Summary of Progress 
Initially, the Standing Committee made good progress. Opinions on the strengths and 
weaknesses of external reviews were sought from a wide cross-section of those who had been 
5 
involved in organizing or conducting them. The essence of this collective experience was then 
incorporated into a detailed manual on the organization and logistics of reviews, prepared by the 
TAC Secretariat. It is designed as a guide to the satisfactory conduct of all stages of reviews and 
intended primarily for internal use by panel secretaries and the Centre staff with whom they liaise. 
Concurrently, the terms of reference and guidelines for external programme reviews were 
revised and endorsed by the Group. Briefing of panel chairs and members was made more 
systematic and built into the formal process for reviews. All these exercises incorporated 
measures designed to simplify reviews, reduce the number, size and complexity of documents 
supplied to panel members and keep the total cost within reasonable bounds. 
Figure 1 shows total expenditure on reviews from 1980 to 1990. From 1983 onwards the 
figures include the cost of management reviews. Total costs are shown as percentages of Centre 
operating costs in Figure 2. There is no clear trend in the cost of reviews expressed in this way. 
However, for the four smaller Centres - WARDA, IFPRI, ISNAR and IBPGR the cost of reviews 
has been in the range 2.4 - 5.2% of Centre operating costs. For the remainder, the cost has been 
in the range 0.5 - 1.8%. Considering that reviews are conducted at five-year intervals, the annual 
cost is relatively small. 
Table 1 gives a breakdown of the cost of programme and management component of 
reviews separately. Average travel costs for programme component account for 31% of total 
costs of programme reviews, and average travel costs for management component account for 
41% of total costs of management reviews. The average cost of management reviews as a 
percentage of total costs of reviews is about 30%. 
The Standing Committee has also kept under consideration the need for reviews of 
activities that relate to more than one Centre, as well as to consider broader issues that are 
System-wide in their implications. For these reasons, the forthcoming reviews of ILCA and 
ILRAD have been planned to take piace in close sequence, with one panel member being 
common to both reviews. Moreover, an inter-centre review of rice has been planned to span the 
period of the reviews of both IRRI and WARDA, with one panel member from each Centre 
review also participating in the inter-centre review. 
The most urgent need initially identified by the Standing Committee, however, was to 
establish a data-base of names of potential panel members and chairs. Plans were drawn up early 
in 1988 to harness the assistance of the Centres, donors and others to canvas widely for new 
people, particularly from the developing countries and among the younger members of the world 
scientific community. 
This work had only just got under way, however, when the report of the review of the 
CGIAR Secretariat was presented to the Group. The report highlighted a comparable need for a 
data-base of candidates for appointment to Centre Boards and to TAC. Because of the 
similarities between these various requirements, it was decided to amalgamate the two efforts, and 
to begin work on a joint data-base under the auspices of the CGIAR Secretariat. 
Nonetheless, the Standing Committee, with support from the TAC Secretariat, continued 
its own efforts to find new people, because of the urgency of the need and the time required for 
the new data-base to become operational. It is expected, however, that the “Candidate 
Information System”, as it is now known, will increasingly be in a position to meet the needs for 
selection of members of review panels. 
Figure 1. Total Expenditure of External Reviews, 1980-1990 
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Table 1 A cost of Proqran~ne and Management Reviews in US Dollars 
ProgramTIe component Management component 
Year: centre Professional Travel Other Total Travel as Professional Travel Total Travel as 
Fees y costs y costs I/ x of Total Fees J./ costs L/ costs I/ % of Totat 
- 
19ao ILRAD 31,692 20,562 1,067 53,321 8.6 
- 
1981 ILCA 2/ 59,938 30,151 4,049 94.138 32.0 
1984 ClAT 117,053 51,632 7,573 176.258 29.3 29,175 18.163 47.330 30.4 
IFPRI 46,039 32,710 5,161 83,910 39.0 19,800 11,285 31,085 36.3 
ICRISAT 102,296 40,493 4,134 146,923 27.6 37,495 22,431 59,926 37.4 
1985 IEPCR 60,523 30,133 7,381 98,037 30.7 14,300 11,625 25,925 44.8 
ISNAR 68,640 33,746 4,736 107,122 31.5 23,550 14,177 37,727 37.6 
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In all of this work, a particular effort has been made to find more candidates from 
developing countries and more women. Table 2 shows the number of candidates screened by the 
Standing Committee for programme reviews. It suggests some success in obtaining greater 
numbers of available candidates from developing countries, but no success with finding more 
women. Efforts are continuing, however, and any help that members of the Group might provide 
in this respect would be much appreciated. 
In general, the Standing Committee has made good progress in meeting its terms of 
reference, and has undoubtedly succeeded in doing a lot of detailed work that would otherwise 
have found its way on to the main TAC agenda. After a successful initial phase, however, a 
“second generation” of problems has arisen which are proving difficult to solve. These have arisen 
partly as a consequence of the changing emphasis of programme reviews and partly because of the 
desire to integrate more completely the programme and management aspects of reviews. 
At its 54th meeting, TAC discussed a report submitted by the Standing Committee, which 
summarized its first three years of operation. The report was supplemented by additional material 
supplied by the CGIAR Secretariat, which was incorporated into the discussion. 
TAC concluded that the present review process has served the CGIAR well. It has been 
valuable to the donors, the Centres, the developing countries, and to those who participate in 
reviews. Nonetheless, TAC concurred with the Standing Committee that the time has come to 
take a hard look at the whole process of external reviews and consider how improvements might 
be made for the future. 
5. Chaneine Demands on Review Panels 
There is no doubt that the old-style quinquennial reviews conducted prior to 1982 
presented, at least initially, a much easier assignment for panel members than the present reviews. 
A typical panel for a major commodity Centre used to comprise about nine members, all 
well-established in their respective disciplines, who were called upon mainly to assess the quality 
and relevance of the scientific work of a Centre. Being a panel member was an enjoyable 
intellectual exercise, usually involving exchange of research ideas with Centre staff and making 
recommendations about how best to continue or expand the programme. 
Since 1987 review panels have increasingly been asked to concentrate on broad strategic 
issues rather than to penetrate into the details of individual programmes. This has called for 
substantially different skills of panel members, involving not only disciplinary expertise but also a 
broad knowledge and vision across several subject areas. 
Today, for the programme component of reviews, we are asking panels of four to six 
members to assess the mechanisms in place to ensure the quality of the work, how priorities and 
strategies are determined, and whether or not they are appropriate, both currently and in the 
future. In addition, panels are expected to make penetrating and comprehensive analyses, 
programme by programme, of relevance and impact. We are asking them to include in these 
analyses topics such as collaboration with national programmes and advanced institutions, 
sustainability, the gender issue, the role of biotechnology and the implications of intellectual 
property rights, as well as the adequacy of facilities and the appropriateness of staffing and levels 
of funding. 
Table 2. Number of Candidates Assessed (a) and Approved (b) for 
External Proqramme Reviews by the Standinq Committee 
Centre 
Year 
(a) Developing region 
Asia 
Africa 3 12 7 6 5 5 19 13 
Latin America 2 6 2 2 1 4 6 2 2 
WANA 1 - - 1 2 
Developed region 
Male 20 44 42 47 50 42 32 57 49 
Female 
Total 
(b) Developing region 
Asia 1 2 - 2 2 5 4 
Africa 1 6 2 4 4 1 10 10 
Latin America 2 4 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 
WANA 
Developed region 
Male 
Female 
Total 
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To tackle any one of these topics, or any one of the programmes, in a penetrating manner 
would present a formidable challenge to any natural or social scientist coming new to the CGIAR 
System. To do so in the short period available for writing, while under intensive pressure to 
contribute to several other aspects of the review as well, is proving very difficult for all but a few 
exceptional individuals. It is this lack of realism in the demands we make on panel members that 
is one of the causes of our mounting concerns over the conduct of reviews. 
During the same period, both the coverage and depth of management reviews have been 
increased. Areas such as governance, finance and personnel have been treated in greater depth 
and some new areas, such as organizational culture, have been introduced. Simultaneously, the 
coverage of the reviews has been expanded with respect to aspects such as leadership, 
organizational structure, and internal processes for planning and review. 
Figure 3 shows the total number of panel members for programme and management 
reviews from 1980 to 1990, with a breakdown in Table 3. Numbers reached a peak during 
1983/84, after which there has been a downward trend. Table 4 shows the number of days spent 
by panel members on reviews. Since 1986, total time spent on eight out of the ten reviews 
conducted has been equal to more than one person-year. 
6. Closer Integration of Proeramme and Management Reviews 
The difficulties outlined above have been compounded by our desire to achieve closer 
integration of the programme and management aspects of reviews. Several considerations have 
led to this desire. As reviews have increasingly focused on institutional performance, rather than 
penetrating into the details of individual programmes, it has become increasingly difficult to define 
logical boundaries between the responsibilities of programme and management panels. In their 
analyses and in their assessments, panels frequently need to combine both programme and 
management considerations. 
Moreover, experience has demonstrated the desirability of having greater consistency in 
the operational details of the two aspects of reviews, including sharing the same review 
techniques, such as those involved in interviewing Centre staff. In addition, it has become 
increasingly desirable to have closer coordination of routine matters, such as the terms and 
conditions under which panel members are engaged by the two secretariats. 
In the past, the extent to which members from the two panels have interacted during the 
conduct of a review has been variable and heavily dependent on the personalities of the two 
panel chairs. Some panels have worked very closely together to the extent that they have, in 
effect, operated as a single panel. Others have not, sometimes resulting in recommendations that 
have not been developed or endorsed in joint discussions. Furthermore, having the two panels 
regularly involved in joint discussions greatly assists the process of consensus-building. It is these 
and similar considerations that have led us to experiment with joint reviews under a single leader, 
as with the IBPGR Review and those proposed for ISNAR, ILCA, ILRAD, IRRI and WARDA. 
On the operational side, steps are in hand to strengthen the links between the two 
secretariats and to ensure the continued development of a common institutional memory on all 
the detailed points that need to be kept in mind during the planning and conduct of reviews. 
More general points of principle that need to be resolved from time to time, as well as matters 
such as agreeing on the division of labour between the two secretariats, are now decided by an ad 
hoc policy group, comprising the Chair and Executive Secretary of TAC, the CGIAR Executive 
Secretary, the Management Advisor from the CGIAR Secretariat and the Chair of the TAC 
Standing Committee for External Reviews. 
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T_able--3, Number of Panel Members (excludins Resource Persons) for 
External Prosramme and Manaqement Reviews 
Year Centre Programme Management Total 
Panel Panel 
1980 ILRAD 7 7 
1981 ILCA 6 6 
1982 IRRI I 8 I I 8 
1 CIMMYT I 7 I I 7 I 
1983 1 IITA 13 
ICARDA 9 3 12 
CIP 6 I 2 I 8 I 
IWARDA I 5 I 2 I 7 
T-- ~~~~~~~~ 
1984 CIAT 9 3 12 
ICRISAT 8 4 12 
IFPRI 5 2 7 
1985 IBPGR 5 1 6 
ISNAR 5 2 7 
1986 ILCA 7 3 10 
ILRAD 6 2 8 
1987 IRRI 7 4 11 
1988 ICARDA 7 4 11 
I CIMMYT 3 
1989 CIAT 6 3 9 
CIP 4 3 7 
1990 IITA 6 3 9 
ICRISAT 5 4 9 
IFPRI 4 I 4 8 
14 
Table 4. Number of Days Spent by Panel Members (excluding Resource 
Persons) on External Proqramme and Manasement Reviews 
Year Centre Programme Management Total 
Person-Days Person-Days Person-Days 
1980 ILRAD 83 83 
1981 ILCA 216 216 
1982 IRRI 184 184 
CIMMYT 272 272 
1983 CIP 150 39 189 
ICARDA 256 82 338 
IITA 226 127 353 
WARDA 178 55 233 
1984 CIAT 311 132 443 
ICRISAT 307 155 462 
IFPRI 114 57 171 
1985 IBPGR 97 52 149 
ISNAR 208 89 297 
1986 ILCA 233 152 385 
ILRAD 174 87 261 
1987 IRRI 248 157 405 
1988 CIMMYT 275 100 375 
ICARDA 232 170 402 
1989 CIAT 238 141 379 
CIP 215 117 332 
1990 IITA 218 127 345 
ICRISAT 212 178 390 
IFPRI 217 150 367 
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7. Constraints to Efficiency in the Current Process 
7.1. Recognition of the Trade-Offs 
All of these changes are helping to iron out the day to day problems that have arisen from 
mounting external reviews. However, if we are to make changes to reviews with the aim of 
reducing some of the constraints under which panels currently work, there must be wider 
recognition of the trade-offs that have to be made. Of the several different types of trade-offs 
involved, the most important concern donor requirements. Others involve such considerations as 
openness versus exclusivity, experience versus externality, and current imperatives versus future 
needs. 
7.2. Donor Requirements 
In the absence of external reviews, each donor agency would have to use alternative 
methods of obtaining necessary assurance that its money was being well spent. In the extreme, 
this might result in periodic reviews of all Centres by all donors, and any pressure for this to occur 
is clearly to be avoided. The most crucial trade-offs, therefore, are between what the donors see 
as their minimum expectations from reviews, and how far these reasonably can be met by a small 
external panel working for a relatively short period of time. 
Based on experience from recent reviews, the Standing Committee’s report to TAC 
suggested that increasing expectations of the scope and quality of reviews have sometimes placed 
an unrealistic burden on panels. To reach the expected standard calls for finding panel chairs and 
members with capabilities that are difficult to find on the scale required. 
The reality is that, in spite of rigorous attempts to improve the selection process, most 
panels continue to contain a proportion of “passengers”. With the pressure to keep panels small, 
this has imposed unreasonable workloads on the few remaining individuals, whether panel 
members or “resource persons”. Furthermore, the resulting difficulties of keeping to the agreed 
timetable for producing the report have sometimes made it necessary to mount a “rescue 
operation” to produce an adequate report on time. Usually, the solution to these problems has 
been to involve the “resource persons” attached to panels to an increasing extent in writing the 
report, thus putting at risk the whole concept of “external” reviews. 
The alternatives of expanding the number of panel members, or the time spent on 
reviews, would escalate the cost to unacceptable levels in terms both of the actual budget, and of 
the opportunity cost of the time required from Centre staff and the Secretariats. It would also 
further restrict the choice of panel members and virtually exclude those at, or near, the peak of 
their careers, who already find it difficult to make a commitment to the amount of time involved. 
Considerations, such as these, define the most urgent trade-offs for which appropriate 
balances have to be struck. Striking them implies ensuring that panels continue to conduct 
thorough and comprehensive reviews, and persuading donors to keep their expectations of reviews 
within manageable bounds. 
7.3. Openness versus Exclusivity 
There are many aspects to the decisions that have to be made to keep the scope of 
reviews within reasonable bounds. Another aspect of the same problem results from our desire to 
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keep reviews as open as possible, in the sense of seeking inputs on the issues from the whole 
spectrum of CGIAR stakeholders. If views have been widely sought, it is difFrcult to ignore them. 
For example, during its initial analyses of the lessons to be learnt from past reviews, the 
Standing Committee identified, among many other potential overloads, that too many questions 
were being put to panels. The Committee considered that a few general questions could be 
phrased that would cover most of the points usually raised by donors, leaving scope for a few 
specific questions to be added for each Centre, in turn. The aim was to keep the list as short as 
possible - because it is impossible for panel members to keep a long list in their minds. 
However, after seeking the views of TAC, the CGIAR Secretariat and members of the 
Group, we are often faced with lists of questions that are far too long. Even after some 
screening, the recent IBPGR Review Panel, for example, was confronted with a total of no less 
than 87 questions. The opinion of the panel members was that such a large number of questions 
was not helpful. It served chiefly to confuse the issues and slow down the process. 
For similar reasons, it has been difficult to keep the terms of reference for reviews, and 
the guidelines that accompany them, as concise and simple as might be hoped. Even attempts to 
reduce the pile of documents presented to panels have been short-lived, because circumstances 
invariably dictate that more documents should be added. New TAC documents dealing with 
policies, priorities, or strategies are automatically added. Interested parties want their viewpoints 
placed before the panel, which usually entails looking at lengthy reports or other documents. The 
panels themselves respond to complex issues by calling for more information, to which Centres 
sometimes respond by providing volume rather than essence. The result is that, in struggling to 
familiarize themselves with all the documents, panel members often fail to digest the most 
important ones. 
While it is essential that the views of stakeholders are in no way excluded from the 
process, it is equally important for everyone to recognize that reviews must be selective. The 
process of screening the questions received from stakeholders is being made more rigorous and, in 
future, only the more important ones will find their way into a consolidated list. For this to be 
successful it will require understanding on the part of stakeholders, especially when they fail to 
find their own specific questions attached to the terms of reference for a particular review. 
Other improvements under discussion include further streamlining of the documents 
supplied to panels. To achieve this there will be greater consultation with the Centres regarding 
the information that panels require, both from the Centres themselves and in connection with 
visits to national programmes with which they collaborate. 
7.4. Experience versus Externality 
Other trade-offs relate to what we mean by “external”. There is no doubt that individuals 
selected for their performance on previous review panels can, in general, be relied upon to 
contribute more effectively than newcomers to a second, or third, review. The question then 
arises of how many times the same individual can be used as a panel member or chair, without 
compromising the principle of objectivity and externality. 
Others who have been previously associated with the System in one way or another also 
tend to make better panel members than those who have not. These might include former 
Centre staff, former employees of the Secretariats, and former members of donor delegations. 
They come to a review in a better position than newcomers to make informed judgements. It 
requires a very great deal of hard work on the part of newcomers to the System to acquire 
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sufficient background knowledge to make informed judgements. Clearly, however, caution must 
be exercised to try to preserve the distinction between an informed judgement and an “insider” 
judgement which, in turn, poses the question of what we really mean by “external”. 
Similar considerations apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to Secretariat staff and TAC 
members attached to panels in a supporting role. Criticisms in these respects are now commonly 
voiced. There have been criticisms that Secretariat staff acting as consultants to panels have 
exerted too strong an influence on the outcome of reviews. Even staff appointed as panel 
secretaries are not immune from these considerations, especially if they see themselves as 
controllers, or are appointed to fulfill a dual function - that of strengthening a particular area of 
expertise on the panel, as well as acting as secretary. 
The participation of TAC members in reviews has always been somewhat controversial 
among TAC members. Some have been opposed to it, wishing to see reviews as being totally 
external. Others have been in favour of it because they see TAC as an independent entity. In 
the spirit of compromise, when TAC members now serve on panels, they do so as “resource 
persons”. They are invited to serve at the discretion of the TAC Chair. In effect, they fulfil a 
role that is identical to that of consultants. The TAC member (like a consultant) is there to 
support the work of the panel, without becoming directly involved in formulating the 
recommendations or being committed to their adoption by the panel. 
All these arguments point to the need to keep under review the balance between internal 
knowledge and external objectivity. They do not provide a formula, however, by which that 
balance can easily be struck. 
7.5. Immediate Imperatives versus Future Necessities 
The issues that panels are asked to resolve have become so complex, and require an 
understanding of so much background information, that there is a temptation, when choosing 
panel members, to consider only the immediate task and to arrive at the best team possible to do 
the review in question. If we are to plan for the future, however, a panel cannot be regarded 
simply as a task-force to perform a specific function. It must also be seen as a training ground for 
future panel members and chairs. 
Review panels can also provide excellent education for present and future TAC members, 
as well as for future members of Centre boards. Arguably, there is no better way for an outsider 
to acquire an understanding of the CGIAR System, or to gain insights into the work of a Centre, 
than by participating in an external review. 
In this respect, the trade-off is between constructing a panel to do the immediate job in 
the most efficient manner, and deliberately including some less experienced members as “learners” 
who have the potential to make contributions to the System’s activities in the longer-term future. 
In this context, it is especially important to find younger individuals with the right attitudes and 
motivation. 
These are some of the trade-offs that have to be made when planning reviews. There are 
no “correct” compromises for any of them. Whatever balance is chosen, that choice will be 
vulnerable to criticism, especially with the wisdom of hindsight. It is important, however, that the 
Group should be aware of the difficult decisions that these trade-offs impose on those who plan 
and organize reviews, and that members of the Group should be willing to moderate their 
expectations accordingly. 
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8. Outions for the Future 
8.1. Improving the Present Process 
With the completion of each review, it is never difficult to see how improvements could 
have been made. During informal debriefing of panel chairs and Secretariat staff, the problems 
identified are seldom new. Most have been identified more than once before. They occur in 
different combinations for each review. As one problem is avoided, another recurs. They have 
not consistently been overcome because, with each new panel, we start anew. The lessons cannot 
be fully learnt without first experiencing them. 
For these reasons, and because of the increase in the number of CGIAR institutions, it is 
the intention of the two Secretariats to accord even higher priority to their work on reviews and 
to devote greater resources to them. Various mechanisms are under consideration to strengthen 
the linkages between the two Secretariats in the planning and organization of reviews, and to 
ensure that the lessons learnt become firmly embedded in a collective institutional memory. 
Careful thought is being given to additional ways in which panels could be guided in their work 
without restricting their freedom of action and, more generally, to ensure that agreed principles 
are consistently translated into practice. 
Various modifications to current procedures are under consideration or are already being 
tried. For example, greater help can be given to panels by doing more of the work in advance by 
Secretariat staff or consultants. Both Secretariats have already experimented with the use of 
consultants to study specialized aspects of a Centre’s activities in advance of the review, and this 
principle would probably be applied more extensively. 
As far as report writing is concerned, the problem is aggravated by the tradition of having 
the final report available before the panel leaves the Centre, a tradition that will not, in future, be 
considered obligatory, provided all the recommendations have been agreed. Consideration is also 
being given to the use of professional editorial assistance on a more routine basis. These and 
other changes will go some way towards alleviating the present problems, but additional changes 
may also be desirable. 
8.2. Experimenting with Changes 
For those reviews that are currently at an advanced stage of planning, we have no option 
other than to attempt to improve the present process. For future reviews, however, we are 
seeking opinions from the Group on the desirability of experimenting with some modified 
approaches. Modifications might be aimed at reducing the load on panel members, or reducing 
the total load of review work. 
In essence there are two ways of reducing the load on panel members. Either the tasks 
that panel members are expected to perform could be reduced, or the panel could be given more 
support. As the purpose of an external review is to take a broad look at a Centre’s performance, 
and to give the panel the freedom to penetrate into any issue that arises, it would be difficult to 
devise a satisfactory means of limiting the scope of a review. The alternative of providing panels 
with greater support could be developed in various ways. For example, a small, but carefully 
constructed support team could be appointed to work with the panel and undertake some of the 
work currently done by panel members. 
The only feasible way of reducing the total load of review work is to reduce the frequency 
of reviews. From previous discussions in the Group, it is clear that donors would prefer to retain 
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the five-year cycle, and that they would not favour relaxing, in any way, the general oversight of 
Centres provided by external reviews. However, it might be possible to consider the introduction 
of some type of interim assessment or “monitoring review” that might permit an option to 
lengthen the interval between traditional external reviews, at least in some instances. These two 
options for modifying reviews are discussed in greater detail below. 
8.2.1. Increasinp the Supuort for Panels 
Support for external review panels is currently provided by staff of the Secretariats and, 
occasionally, by consultants, a TAC member, or both. The extent to which greater support of this 
general type could be given to panels without infringing the principle of externality is a matter for 
debate, but it might well be worth trying. 
As we have seen, the problem of overload of panels has many causes, but manifests itself 
most clearly when it comes to writing the report. The problem is not only one of writing, 
however. Panel members often have difficulty in absorbing all the necessary background 
information, developing an analytical framework for their assessments, and expressing their views 
clearly in English. These are exacting tasks which, to perform effectively in a short period of 
time, involve what is proving to be a rare combination of experience and skills. 
One possible remedy, therefore, would be to rationalize what, to a greater or lesser extent, 
is already happening in review panels. Without any prior intention of doing so, many panels 
gradually divide themselves into one group that writes most of the report and another that feeds 
ideas into the discussions and reacts to what has been written. It might be possible to build on 
this experience and explicitly provide assistance to the panel in preparing the report, but to do so 
in ways that would preserve the external character of the review. 
An approach could be envisaged in which the panel would be served by a support team. 
The external panel would remain the dominant component of the review. It would control the 
work of the support team, select those issues on which the support team should work in depth, 
and guide it in the writing assigned to it. The external panel would control the writing of the 
final report and draft its own overall assessments and recommendations. 
The function of the support team would be to relieve the external panel of some of the 
analytical work and writing on which panel members spend so much of their time under the 
present arrangements. It would help to sift through the background material, clarify the issues, 
and present options for the external panel to discuss. It would work with the panel during the 
initial phase of the review, when the panel would define the work to be done by the study team 
before the main phase of the review was started. 
This approach would enable use to be made of experienced reviewers, in addition to 
Secretariat staff and TAC members, as participants in the work of support teams. It would allow 
greater continuity in the learning process of review procedures and perhaps lead to greater 
consistency in the nature of reviews across the various institutions. It would also help to avoid 
the overload on panel members and would make it possible to widen the field of choice for panel 
members among newcomers to the System. 
Its main disadvantage would be that the support team might dominate the outcome of the 
review. To avoid this possibility, the chair of the external panel would have to exert strong 
control over the work of the support team, and particular attention would have to be given to 
selection of the members of the team to ensure their objectivity. The objectivity of the panel 
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could be further safeguarded by excluding the support team from some of the panel’s final 
deliberations. 
8.2.2. An Interim or Monitoring Review 
Another approach that could be tried would aim, not to reduce the burden on panel 
members, but to reduce the total number of external reviews that have to be mounted. If a small 
team of Secretariat staff, consultants, or both were to examine the progress made by a Centre, say 
three to four years after an external review, it might be acceptable to extend the interval between 
successive reviews. 
The interim or monitoring review would look especially at the Centre’s implementation of 
the recommendations of the previous full review and advise TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat on 
whether or not another external review should be mounted after five years, or whether there was 
a case for postponing it. If the total number of reviews could be reduced in this way it would 
reduce the overall cost of reviews, as well as the work involved in planning and organizing them. 
It would also help to reduce the agenda for meetings of both TAC and the CGIAR. 
9. Monitoring the Implementation of Recommendations 
During TAC’s discussion of these options, the question of monitoring the implementation 
of review recommendations was raised in a more general context. At present, the extent of 
monitoring is largely dependent on decisions taken during the Group’s discussion of review 
reports, which has occasionally resulted in mounting a mid-term review, or some other specific 
monitoring action. There is no regular or mandatory procedure, however. 
TAC considers that there is perhaps a case for introducing a more formal mechanism for 
monitoring the action taken by a Centre as a result of an external review. The view was 
expressed that if a stricter mechanism were in place, it might be possible to make a stronger case 
for having greater flexibility in the interval between successive reviews. 
Several suggestions were made in this regard. Centres might be requested to make a 
written statement to TAC and the CGIAR one year after completion of the review. They could 
be asked for a progress report as part of their presentation to TAC of their medium-term 
programme and budget, which normally occurs in the year following an external review; or they 
could be invited to report regularly to the Group, as part of their biennial presentations at 
Centres Week. The Group might wish to comment on these suggestions. 
10. Conclusion 
Having regard to the importance of external reviews and the expansion of the CGIAR to 
18 institutions (or more), TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat are taking steps to ensure their 
continued thoroughness, objectivity and quality. Members of the Group can assist by accepting 
some flexibility, at least on an experimental basis, in the way in which reviews are conducted and 
in the interval between successive reviews. The aim is to ease the burden on panel members and 
reduce the total number of reviews required, without relaxing the oversight to which Centres are 
exposed. 
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APPENDIX I 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
Terms of Reference for the TAC Standing Committee for External Reviews 
(June 1988) 
Assess the accumulated experience and lessons learnt from external reviews 
commissioned by TAC in order to improve the terms of reference of reviews, and 
the briefing available to panel members and chairpersons. 
Suggest mechanisms for shortening, streamlining and increasing the efficiency of 
the external review process. 
Examine current methods of identifying panel members and chairpersons with a 
view to developing a long-term plan to ensure an adequate supply of both. 
Develop a system for evaluating the performance of panel members as potential 
chairpersons. 
Study mechanisms for relating EPRs and commodity/activity reviews more closely 
with resource allocation and priority setting in the CGIAR. 
Study mechanisms for monitoring the scientific quality and relevance of Centre 
programmes with a view to guiding review panels in their assessments. 
Guide the Secretariat in planning future reviews. 
Anticipate reviews at least three years in advance and begin identifying potential 
chairpersons and members l-2 years in advance. 
Recommend to the TAC Chairman and the Committee, at least one year in 
advance of an anticipated review, the proposed candidates for chairperson and 
members of a small panel, and the proposed terms of reference. 
(Added in 1989) 
To improve the coordination of programme and management reviews and 
encourage communication between the organizers of both. 
